Learning from traffic data collected before, during and after a hurricane  by Archibald, Erik & McNeil, Sue
IATSS Research 36 (2012) 1–10
Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect
IATSS ResearchLearning from trafﬁc data collected before, during and after a hurricane
Erik Archibald a, Sue McNeil b,⁎
a Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware, Newark DE 19716, USA
b Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering, University of Delaware, Newark DE 19716, USA⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 302 831 6578.
E-mail addresses: archy@udel.edu (E. Archibald), sm
0386-1112/$ – see front matter © 2012 International A
doi:10.1016/j.iatssr.2012.06.002a b s t r a c ta r t i c l e i n f oArticle history:
Received 7 April 2012
Received in revised form 28 June 2012
Accepted 30 June 2012
Keywords:
Disasters
Evacuation
Trafﬁc counts
Hurricane
Trafﬁc patterns
Emergency servicesHurricanes harm people and damage property through extreme wind speeds and ﬂooding associated with
heavy rains and storm surge. One of the most effective and widely used tactics to protect people from hurri-
canes is evacuation. Improved knowledge of the behavior of communities before, during and after an evacu-
ation can better support emergency planning and operations, and thus help make evacuations safer and more
efﬁcient. The objective of this work is to identify ways to use trafﬁc data to better understand evacuation be-
havior and to explore ways to integrate trafﬁc data into evacuation planning and response. Trafﬁc data col-
lected in Delaware before, during and after Hurricane Irene in August 2011 using automated trafﬁc
recorders are assembled and analyzed. The analysis shows that a signiﬁcant number of residents and visitors
evacuated from the beach communities and the evacuation patterns are very similar to the trafﬁc patterns
experienced on summer weekends. These insights suggest that this type of analysis may also be of value
for other events in other communities.
© 2012 International Association of Trafﬁc and Safety Sciences. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation
Experiences over the past two decades provide clear evidence of
the destructive power of hurricanes, also known as cyclones and ty-
phoons. These experiences demonstrate the importance of develop-
ing strategies to prepare for and mitigate the impacts of hurricanes.
Hurricanes harm people and damage property through extreme
wind speeds and ﬂooding associated with heavy rains and storm
surge. Hurricanes are a major problem in the U.S. and around the
world. Hurricanes cause about $10 billion in damages in the U.S.
each year [1]. Beyond recurring yearly losses, hurricanes also have
the potential to cause catastrophic loss. For example, in 1970, a ty-
phoon caused one of the largest catastrophes in world history, killing
over 300,000 people in Bangladesh. More recently, in 2005, Hurricane
Katrina caused $108 billion in damage and killed 1200 people on the
Gulf Coast of the U.S [2]. Hurricanes have been and will continue to be
a cause for concern as population centers in coastal areas around the
world continue to grow [3].
One of the most effective and widely used tactics to protect people
from hurricanes is evacuation [3]. Evacuation allows people to escape
the hazards of extreme wind and ﬂooding. In an evacuation, residents
and visitors of hazardous areas leave before they are exposed to neg-
ative consequences. Evacuations are especially feasible for hurricanes
as advance warnings allow large populations to leave at risk areas be-cneil@udel.edu (S. McNeil).
ssociation of Trafﬁc and Safety Scienfore the hurricane arrives. While evacuations hold the potential to
protect the public, they may put evacuees at unnecessary risk, and
certainly cost government, industry and private citizens' time and
money. Improved knowledge of the behavior of communities before,
during and after an evacuation can better support emergency plan-
ning and operations, and thus help make evacuations safer and
more efﬁcient.
As lead time in issuing hurricane warnings to threatened
populations increases with improvements in hurricane monitoring
and mass communication technology, the social and organizational
features of integrated warning systems become paramount as key
factors in saving lives and reducing damages to property. Even if
the public understands hurricane forecasts, their trust in the reli-
ability and accuracy of these forecasts, and in the sources that pro-
vide such information, may signiﬁcantly impact their behavior and
response [4,5]. For example, public conﬁdence and trust in the
sources that provide such information (e.g., hurricane forecasts
and warnings) has an impact on their perception of risk [6,7]. However,
trust in institutions is a variable entity, often a function of minority sta-
tus and power [5] that at times is undermined by mass media accounts
that convey inaccurate, biased, and exaggerated information [8–11].
Sufﬁcient lead time,moreover, should allow the public to take appropri-
ate action. Previous research has shown that one of themost signiﬁcant
problems with weather forecasts is how the information is presented
and communicated to end-user communities (e.g., government agen-
cies, emergencymanagement organizations, industry, and to the gener-
al population; see Refs. [4,12–14]). It is noteworthy, however, that even
forecasts of severe weather events that attempt to solve these problems
may fail to elicit appropriate protective action (horizontal evacuation,ces. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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a generator, alternate means of communicating etc.) given that an
individual's response to forecasts and warnings is often impacted by
factors that have little to dowith the technical features of weather fore-
casts, such as the individual's social class, education, gender, race, eth-
nicity, cultural background, and previous experiences with weather
events.
Given the different perceptions of events, access to and response
to information, and alternative actions, we know very little about
who actually evacuates and when, if a hurricane warning is issued,
and when the evacuees return. This lack of information is a problem
for both planning for and responding to hurricanes.
1.2. Objective
Traditionally, emergency management agencies perform the
majority of evacuation planning and operations, but recently trans-
portation departments are becoming increasingly involved [3]. This
provides an opportunity for new improvements to evacuation
planning and operations. Speciﬁcally, increased participation of
Departments of Transportation (DOTs) beneﬁts evacuation opera-
tions by involving transportation professionals and utilizing intelli-
gent transportation systems (ITS). Transportation professionals
and ITS provide access to real-time collection and analysis of trafﬁc
data that can be used to inform the planning process and enhance
the efﬁciency of response operations.
The objective of this work is to identify ways to use trafﬁc data to
better understand evacuation behavior and to explore ways to inte-
grate trafﬁc data into evacuation planning and response. This involves
examining trafﬁc data collected in Delaware before, during and after
Hurricane Irene in August 2011. Analysis of this data is performed
and the usefulness of this type of data is then discussed. The use of
trafﬁc data will ultimately allow governments to better plan and exe-
cute evacuations.
1.3. Related work
While a great deal of research focuses on evacuations in general and
hurricane evacuations in particular [15–17], relatively few studiesmake
use of trafﬁc data. Many evacuation studies instead rely on surveys. For
example, Kang et al. [18] compared hypothesized household behavior
with actual behavior during a hurricane. Other studies have used trafﬁc
data to support their data collected from phone interviews. For exam-
ple, Dow and Cutter reviewed data fromHurricane Floyd [15]. A notable
use of trafﬁc data is the analysis of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina evacua-
tion in Louisiana byWolshon [17,19,20]. Trafﬁc data analyses have also
been undertaken for other types of disasters. In Japan, trafﬁc data pro-
vided insight into the impact and recovery from the 1995 Kobe earth-
quake [21]. Other studies use travel demand and trafﬁc models to
plan evacuation routes [22,23] and some recognition has been given
to the importance of integrating behavioral information with the
models [24].
Among state DOTs monitoring and usage of trafﬁc data are far
more common. Across the country, states have been working on de-
veloping and implementing ITS systems using inductive loop trafﬁc
counters and closed circuit television to monitor real-time travel con-
ditions [25]. In hurricane-prone areas, state plans identify these tech-
nologies as an important resource [26]. Florida has a statewide web
based system to monitor trafﬁc data for hurricane response and
parts of Texas use real-time data for hurricane response as well [27].
In Delaware, the area examined in this study, the use of real-time
data for hurricane evacuation is not standard practice as it is in states
that regularly experience hurricanes. Delaware like other states with
some hurricane risk does, however, have planning documents to ad-
dress hurricane hazards. In Delaware, consultants have worked with
Delaware Department of Transportation and Delaware EmergencyManagement Agency to develop all hazards evacuation plans [28–30].
The ArmyCorps of Engineers has also developed aHurricane Evacuation
Study to inform hurricane evacuation planning for the entire Delmarva
Peninsula, which includes Delaware as well as parts of Maryland and
Virginia. This study also deﬁnes behavioral assumptions for the
Delmarva Peninsula [31].
2. Data and data analysis
2.1. Context for the data
Delaware is an Atlantic coastal state. While Delaware is the sec-
ond smallest state (under 2000 square miles or about 5000 square
kilometers) and has a population of about 900,000, vacationers
swell the population of the beach communities each summer. The
state is situated on the Delmarva Peninsula, a narrow body of land
bordered by Chesapeake Bay to the west and Delaware Bay and the
Atlantic Ocean to the east. The state of Delaware is bordered by
Pennsylvania to the north and Maryland to the west and south. The
Chesapeake–Delaware canal crosses northern Delaware providing a
shorter shipping route between Baltimore and Philadelphia. The ma-
jority of the population is clustered in northern Delaware away from
the ocean. State Route 1 and US 13 are the primary north–south
routes. State Route 1 is a multi-lane limited access toll road in north-
ern Delaware. Along the Atlantic Ocean, the beach communities are
developed with a dense local street network. Most access is from
the north with limited access to the west, and to the south via the
Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel. This geography means that
there is limited access to the beach communities. During severe
weather, this may be compounded by closures at the bridges across
the canal, and the Indian River Inlet in southern Delaware.
Although the state frequently experiences severe weather, tropi-
cal storms and hurricanes are less common in the area. In the ﬁve
year period between 2005 and 2010, Delaware experienced 37 se-
vere weather events, of which only one was a tropical storm [32].
Hurricane Irene in August 2011 was the ﬁrst time Delaware experi-
enced a hurricane evacuation.
This work uses data from Hurricane Irene to explore the useful-
ness of trafﬁc data for modeling and understanding hurricane evacu-
ations. Trafﬁc data from Delaware before, during and after the 2011
Hurricane Irene are analyzed, and graphed to identify trafﬁc patterns
before, during and after the mandatory evacuation. This information
is used to make some inference about the behavior of the population.
To put this analysis further in context, the timeline of the event is
reviewed.
On Thursday August 25, 2011, the National Weather Service is-
sued a hurricane warning for coastal Delaware [33] and an hour
later the governor issued an order for the immediate evacuation of
all visitors in coastal areas effective at 6:00 PM, August 25th, local
time. This evacuation order was amended Friday August 26th at
11:00 AM to include a mandatory evacuation for all residents within
three-quarters of a mile (1.1 km) of major bodies of water. Delaware
coastal residents had until 9:00 AM Saturday to evacuate [34]. In
nearby Maryland, the timing and conditions of evacuations orders
varied widely, as individual counties and municipalities made the de-
termination of what kind of evacuation order to issue and when.
Ocean City, Maryland, a coastal community bordering Delaware, pur-
sued one of the most aggressive evacuations in the state, calling for a
mandatory evacuation of all residents and visitors, requiring busi-
nesses to close, banning the sale of alcohol beginning Friday morning
at midnight, restricting entry to only essential personnel and going
door to door Friday to make sure everyone had left [35]. Irene was a
category 1 hurricane as it passed just off the coast of the Delmarva
Peninsula between 8 PM Saturday night, and 5 AM Sundaymorning [33].
August is a busy time for the beach communities in southern Del-
aware. In addition to the residents there are the regular beachgoers
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own property at the beach or have a rental for the season. Visitors
may be vacationers staying in motels, campgrounds or rental proper-
ties or day visitors coming from the surrounding area. Short term
beach rentals typically rent from Saturday to Saturday. Occupancy
rates are typically 100% in August. The weekend following the hurri-
cane was Labor Day weekend, which is traditionally a busy holiday
weekend.2.2. Data sources
The primary sources of data for this project are trafﬁc counts from
the Delaware Department of Transportation (DelDOT). These trafﬁc
counts are collected using inductive loop detectors. DelDOT maintains
75 permanent automatic trafﬁc recorders which provide continuous
volume data in 15 minute or 1 hour increments [36]. In addition to per-
manent dedicated counters, DelDOT provides count data from many of
the trafﬁc signals in operation across the state. Data are not continuous-
ly available for all devices due to loss of solar power or other issues.
For this analysis, data fromanumber of selected sites are examined to
see the impact of hurricane evacuation. The siteswere selected to provide
insights into travel patterns from areas under mandatory evacuation.
Population, housing and demographic data for the analysis are extracted
from United States 2010 Census data using ESRI Community Analyst.
The trafﬁc counters selected are as follows:
• Four count locations are used to look at evacuation behavior from a
10.6 square mile (27.5 square kilometer) area that includes the
small beach communities of Bethany Beach, South Bethany and
Fenwick Island. A trafﬁc counter on DE 1 just north of the Indian
River Inlet Bridge provides data on northward evacuation, counters
on DE 26 and 54 capture the majority of the westward movement
and a counter along DE 1 provides information about movement
into and out of Maryland. Together these counters serve as a cordon
and capture almost all of the trafﬁc entering and exiting the Betha-
ny Beach and Fenwick Island area.
• A trafﬁc counter is located on DE 1 just south of DE 16. This counter
provides information about the number of vehicles moving south
into and north out of a larger area of beaches that contains approx-
imately 96 square miles (248.6 square kilometers) of Rehoboth
Beach, Dewey Beach and Lewes in addition to the small communi-
ties further south.
These locations are shown in Fig. 1. Data were acquired for the pe-
riod August 12 through to September 19, 2011. This period provides
a picture of weekly and daily trafﬁc patterns before and after the
hurricane.3. Data analysis, theory and calculations
To explore and analyze the trafﬁc count data, and infer informa-
tion about evacuation behavior, graphical analysis, summary statis-
tics, and principles of ﬂow conservation are used. Demographic data
and trafﬁc count data can be used to estimate the number of people
moving in the region. This information reﬂects disruptions to travel
patterns and may be useful to better inform evacuation planning
and operations.3.1. Graphical analysis of trafﬁc ﬂow data
Trafﬁc data typically show regular peaking characteristics that reﬂect
seasonal, day of theweek and timeof day variations and are distorted by
events. Graphing trafﬁc against time provides insights into how much
variation occurs in these patterns and helps to identify disruptions.3.2. Using conservation of ﬂow to estimate vehicles evacuated
If sufﬁcient data are available, trafﬁc counts can be used to esti-
mate the population evacuated. This can be done by doing a simple
mass balance, except using number of vehicles instead of mass. Auto-
matic trafﬁc recorders count the number of vehicles passing a given
point over a speciﬁed period of time. This period of time might be a
single day or a number of days over which the evacuation occurred.
If enough counters are available to capture all trafﬁc entering and
exiting the area, one can pinpoint exactly how many vehicles left a
given area in the speciﬁed period. Eq. (1) describes how the change
in vehicle count for an area can be calculated.
Δn ¼∑Allcounters Inbound Count−Outbound Countð Þ ð1Þ
A positive Δn indicates cars entering the area, and a negative value
means that they are leaving.
3.3. Measuring population and percentage evacuated
With a little more information, one can estimate how many
people evacuated in this time period. This is possible by multiply-
ing by the vehicle occupancy rate or number of people per vehicle.
This value can either be assumed or measured. Since entire house-
holds are evacuating it is possible that the vehicle occupancy is not
the same as normal conditions. In Delaware, hurricane planning as-
sumptions do not give guidance on the number of people per vehi-
cle, but they do provide the number of vehicles per household that
would be used in an evacuation and the number of people per
household is found in U.S. Census data. Eq. (2) is used to ﬁnd the
number of evacuees using the number of vehicles that evacuated
(Δn), assuming the number of vehicles per household is the same
for the residents and the visitors.
Number of Evacuees ¼ Δnj j  people per householdð Þ
= vehicles per householdð Þ
ð2Þ
Once this is determined, GIS (geographic information systems)
and demographic data can assist in estimating the percentage of the
population that evacuated. Census data provide the number of per-
manent residents and also the number of seasonal rental units in
that area. Other data are needed or assumptions must be made to de-
termine how many tourists are really in the area. This can be done by
identifying the percent occupancy of seasonal units and the number
of people in each as seen in Eq. (3).
Total Population ¼ permanent residentsþ % occupancy
 seasonal units  visitors per unit ð3Þ
Once the total population is known, the percentage evacuated can
be found by dividing the number of evacuees by the total population
(% Evacuated=Number of evacuees/Total Population).
Trafﬁc data can also provide useful information about the usage of
roadway capacity for evacuation. This can be done by simply dividing
the hourly volume by the capacity for each segment of roadway.
4. Results
4.1. Hourly, daily and weekly trafﬁc ﬂow patterns
To better understand the trafﬁc patterns this analysis focuses on the
trafﬁc data fromRoute 1 south of the Indian River Inlet Bridge. Alternate
routes to Route 1 are inland and this location provides a good indication
of temporal trafﬁc patterns for northbound (NB) and southbound (SB)
trafﬁc from and to the beach communities of Bethany Beach, South
Bethany and Fenwick Island in southern Delaware. Fig. 2 shows graphs
Fig. 1. ATR locations used in the study.
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State Route 1 S of the Indian River Inlet Bridge for the week prior to,
the week of and the week following the hurricane. The graphs are par-
ticularly useful to communicate the diurnal and weekly trafﬁc patterns
visually.
NB trafﬁc typically shows a morning and afternoon peak where SB
trafﬁc generally shows an afternoon and a smaller evening peak. The
anticipated impacts of the approaching hurricane are reﬂected in the
trafﬁc ﬂow data. The day the evacuation order was issued, August 25,
NB trafﬁc shows a more extended morning peak and a higher after-
noon peak. On August 26, the NB trafﬁc ﬂow showed a single peak
and SB peak trafﬁc ﬂow was approximately 25% of the peak value
the previous week. On August 27, the day the storm arrived, there
was almost no trafﬁc in both the NB and SB directions. The Indian
River Inlet Bridge was closed to trafﬁc 4 PM Saturday August 27 and
did not reopen until after 4 PM Sunday August 28 when engineers
had checked for scour. On Monday August 29, SB trafﬁc was much
higher than NB but lower than usual. Trafﬁc is typically heavier on
Fridays, Saturdays, Sundays and Mondays than Tuesdays, Wednes-
days and Thursdays.Table 1 presents another way to look at these data. This shows the
directional volume for each day, the difference and the total volume.
The difference indicates whether vehicles have left the area (nega-
tive) or are entering the area (positive). The total volume (sum) is a
good indication of activity or transportation demand. In this case,
we see that activity is typically very high on weekends, but is very
low the weekend of the hurricane. Activity was also lower the week
immediately after the hurricane. Even though the weather was
sunny and nice, this week is near the end of beach season.
In a typical summer week, people ﬁnishing weekend trips head
back north on Sunday andMonday, and the area begins to accumulate
more people and vehicles on Tuesday and Wednesday. On Thursday,
Friday and Saturday large masses come down to begin vacation or
stay for the weekend. The week before the week of the hurricane,
about the same number of people entered and left the area (190
more vehicles traveled SB than NB in the week of August 14 to August
20). The week of the hurricane (Sunday August 21 to Saturday August
27), 13,215 more vehicles traveled north than south. In the week of
the hurricane, the Sunday and Monday before the hurricane were
similar to the previous week. However unlike other weeks in which
5E. Archibald, S. McNeil / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 1–10people begin to trickle in on Tuesday and Wednesday, the Tuesday
and Wednesday before the hurricane people also showed a net loss.
This is probably not because they were evacuating due to the hurri-
cane. It is more likely that there was a net loss on Tuesday and
Wednesday because as people ﬁnished their vacations and headed
home, those who would regularly come to begin vacations canceled
their plans. On Thursday the governor ordered a mandatory evacua-
tion of all non-residents in coastal areas. This was probably a large
factor in the net loss of 3256 vehicles on Thursday. Residents were
given the deadline to evacuate by 9 AM Saturday morning. On Friday
5731 vehicles left the area and on Saturday a few more left as well.
Of the 13,215 vehicles that left the area, it is important to consider
how many of these were permanent residents and how many were
visitors. The pattern in which residents returned helps answer this
question. Residents would probably be more likely to return to their
homes quickly while vacationers would probably just cancel their va-
cations or go elsewhere. Trafﬁc patterns indicate that most visitors do
not arrive until the weekend. Using the data from Table 1, the cumu-
late net ﬂow NB can be plotted over the period from August 14 to
September 10 as shown in Fig. 3. Assuming the transportation net-
work functions in a similar manner during the evacuation and normal
peak periods (for example, Sundays), then the difference between the
peak cumulative net NB ﬂow on August 27 and the peak cumulative8/15/11 8/16/11 8/17/11 8/18/11
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Fig. 2. Hourly trafﬁc volumes on DE 1 at Indian Rivenet NB ﬂow on September 6 is 4566 vehicles. This net ﬂow provides
an indication of the number of residents evacuating via this route.
4.2. Peaking patterns
Many times planners have a hard time understanding an emer-
gency scenario such as a hurricane evacuation because these events
do not happen very often. Examining trafﬁc data after a hurricane
evacuation can help planners better understand what conditions are
like during a hurricane.
Analysis of trafﬁc data can help planners make comparisons which
allow them to understand evacuation trafﬁc better. In the case for the
beach areas of Delaware, trafﬁc operations personnel recognize the sim-
ilarity of hurricane evacuationwith normal beach trafﬁc. In thewords of
DelDOT's Trafﬁc Management Center Director, Gene Donaldson:
“Moving beach trafﬁc is a familiar task for DelDOT, which does so
every summer weekend…We understand the road network, how
much trafﬁc we can move. We work closely with Maryland” [37]
Trafﬁc data from Hurricane Irene conﬁrm the similarity of normal
beach trafﬁc and hurricane evacuation trafﬁc. In this case a compari-
son of trafﬁc data from before the hurricane (Sunday, August 14),8/19/11 8/20/11 8/21/11 8/22/11
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r for the weeks before, during and after Irene.
Table 1
Daily trafﬁc volume data for DE 1 at Indian River.
Day Date SB NB
Difference
(SB-NB)
Sum
(NB+SB)
Interpretation (for route 1 coastal hwy)
Governor orders immediate evacuation of non-residents
Largest day for evacuation.
Most evacuees leave by 9:00 AM deadline
Day after storm, many people come back.
Monday, lots of people come back.
Sun 8/14/2011 9479 12276
Mon 8/15/2011 11154 11598
Tue 8/16/2011 11216 11114
Wed 8/17/2011 11622 11142
Thu 8/18/2011 12722 11929
Fri 8/19/2011 14086 12707
Sat 8/20/2011 13918 13241
Sun 8/21/2011 9507 12210
Mon 8/22/2011 10825 11728
Tue 8/23/2011 9890 10200
Wed 8/24/2011 10606 10614
Thu 8/25/2011 10232 13488
Fri 8/26/2011 3415 9146
Sat 8/27/2011 340 644
Sun 8/28/2011 2095 1134
Mon 8/29/2011 8262 4810
Tue 8/30/2011 8020 6679
Wed 8/31/2011 8700 7729
Thu 9/1/2011 11109 8429
Fri 9/2/2011 14570 10104
Sat 9/3/2011 14167 12569
Sun 9/4/2011 11521 13732
Mon 9/5/2011 6486 13228
Tue 9/6/2011 7826 9776
Wed 9/7/2011 6642 6625
Thu 9/8/2011 7462 6950
Fri 9/9/2011 10380 7974
Sat 9/10/2011 9311 8617
-2797 21755
-444 22752
102 22330
480 22764
793 24651
1379 26793
677 27159
-2703 21717
-903 22553
-310 20090
-8 21220
-3256 23720
-5731 12561
-304 984
961 3229
3452 13072
1341 14699
971 16429
2680 19538
4466 24674
1598 26736
-2211 25253
-6742 19714
-1950 17602
17 13267
512 14412
2406 18354
694 17928
Early birds start to make it to beach for vacation
Most people come to beach in time for weekend
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Fig. 3. Cumulative net ﬂow NB.
6 E. Archibald, S. McNeil / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 1–10the day of the evacuation (Thursday, August 25) and Labor Day (Mon-
day, September 5) in Fig. 3 helps people see that evacuation trafﬁc
might not be totally unexpected. In an area where the number of
tourists in coastal areas far exceeds the permanent population, it is
reasonable that a day when all the tourists leave would be quite sim-
ilar to an evacuation in which everyone closest to the coast leaves.
Fig. 4 shows the similarity between evacuation trafﬁc, Labor Day traf-
ﬁc and Sunday trafﬁc at two different points along Coastal Highway,
Route 1.
The graphs (Fig. 4) show that peak evacuation trafﬁc actually
ended up being less than both Labor Day trafﬁc and Sunday trafﬁc
from the 2 weeks prior. This knowledge helps transportation and
emergency management ofﬁcials understand what they are dealing
with and respond appropriately.
4.3. Estimating the population evacuation
The methods from Section 3 are used to identify how many evac-
uees left the coastal areas of Bethany Beach, South Bethany and
Fenwick Island. This is done using the trafﬁc counters at the Indian
River Inlet Bridge on DE 1, DE26 at Assawoman Bridge, DE 54 at Har-
poon Hannahs and DE 1 at the Maryland border. These counters serve
as a cordon around the area and capture most, but not quite all trafﬁc
entering and exiting a 10.6 square mile area. According to the ESRI
Community Analyst's processing of the 2010 census, this area is
home to about 4372 permanent residents living in 2271 households.Beyond the resident population, in the summer the area contains
many tourists and has about 8944 housing units available for season-
al/recreational use recorded in the 2010 census. The trafﬁc count lo-
cations and area are shown in Fig. 5.
We can calculate how many people evacuated from this area for a
given time period using the trafﬁc counts. From the time of the ﬁrst
evacuation order (8/25 18:00) to the evacuation deadline (8/27
9:00) 24,867 vehicles entered the area and 35,305 exited the area
using four different routes. By subtracting the two we see that net
10,438 vehicles left the area during the period of the evacuation.
Most of these evacuated by heading north on DE 1 across the Indian
7E. Archibald, S. McNeil / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 1–10River bridge or by heading west on DE 26. By making an assumption
about the occupancy of each vehicle, we can estimate howmany peo-
ple evacuated in this time period. In 2006 a study on evacuation be-
havior in the Delmarva Peninsula found that on average people
would use 1.3 cars per household to evacuate [31]. U.S. 2010 census
data put together for the area indicate that there are 1.93 people
per household. This information can be used to ﬁnd howmany people
evacuated using this route, in this time window using Eq. (2).
Using Eq. (2) reveals that approximately 15,461 people (10,438
vehicles times 1.93 people per household divided by 1.3 vehicles
per household) left the area during the time period in which the evac-
uation order was in effect (8/25 18:00 to 8/27 9:00). This same meth-
od was used to determine that from noon the Saturday before the
hurricane to noon the Saturday of the hurricane there were 44,693
fewer people. This includes not only those who evacuated directly be-
fore the hurricane, but also accounts for the fact that over the course
of the week before the hurricane many visitors ended their vacations
as planned and went home while new visitors did not come in to re-
place them.
ESRI Community Analyst was used to estimate population, house-
holds and number of vacation units for the speciﬁed area. This anal-
ysis shows that the area has 4372 people living in 2271 households
and has 8944 seasonal residential use units. In addition, searches of
websites for campgrounds, motels, hotels and bed and breakfasts
identiﬁed another 1493 units. Using an assumption of 90% for occu-
pancy rate for the seasonal housing and 2.05 visitors per unit we
can estimate the total population [31]. This estimates the total2500
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Fig. 4. Comparisons of weekend anpopulation as being 23,628 people. Given that this is peak season, as-
suming 100% occupancy, then the population is estimated to be
25,769.
The percent of the residents and visitors that evacuated can be
found by dividing the total number of evacuees by the total popula-
tion. In this case the percent evacuated is approximately 60–65%, a
signiﬁcant portion of residents and visitors.
5. Discussion
5.1. Real-time trafﬁc data applications for operations
In a disaster, emergency operations personnel continually seek
new information to understand how an incident is developing and
how their actions are making an impact. This information builds a sit-
uational awareness of the circumstances they face [27]. Increased sit-
uational awareness helps ofﬁcials monitor and respond to changing
conditions. Trafﬁc data can be a useful tool for situational awareness
due to its widespread availability. In many areas the use of trafﬁc
data can be easily utilized due to already existing infrastructure and
low manpower requirements for collection and analysis.
Real-time trafﬁc data may be useful for a number of different func-
tional needs in emergency operations. The statistic of howmany vehi-
cles or people are evacuating on a given route is useful for a number
of reasons. This information could be used by transportation ofﬁcials
to anticipate demand on other parts of the system. It can also provide
information that will help transportation and law enforcement knowSunday Traffic 8/14
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d evacuation trafﬁc patterns.
Fig. 5. Evacuation area and trafﬁc count locations.
8 E. Archibald, S. McNeil / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 1–10what places need trafﬁc control or other resources the most. Emer-
gency management ofﬁcials concerned with receiving evacuees will
be interested in this information so that they can plan for the needs
of the incoming evacuees. These needs will depend on local evacua-
tion practices. People may have informational needs such as what to
do and where to go. The number of incoming evacuees can also be
used to inform shelter management, so that they can adjust their
stafﬁng and logistics operations to appropriately anticipate housing
evacuees.
The percentage of people which have evacuated and population
remaining in an area is also a useful statistic. These statistics help
transportation ofﬁcials have an idea of how many people have evacu-
ated and how many more people are expected to evacuate from an
area. This information can also be used to adjust routing, make public
messages and adjust trafﬁc control as needed to get as many people
out as possible and avoid leaving people on the road when the hurri-
cane hits. The percent evacuated and population remaining can also
help local public safety. Local ﬁrst responders will be interested in
knowing how much of the population is left so that they can be
ready to respond after the hurricane to help those who have not
evacuated.
5.2. Use of trafﬁc data for post-incident review and planning
Trafﬁc data from an evacuation can be very useful to ofﬁcials
reviewing their actions in a hurricane and planning for the nexthurricane. The analysis of trafﬁc data can help emergency manage-
ment and transportation ofﬁcials understand how the public and
road network behave during a hurricane evacuation. This will allow
them to make better plans. This will help them make connections
that improve the way they manage trafﬁc. They could also compare
to new plans to the old trafﬁc data to see if the plans are appropriate.
5.3. Observations related to evacuation behavior in Delaware
A number of observations can be made about the Delaware trafﬁc
data analyzed from hurricane Irene.
Trafﬁc data are useful to see how closely evacuation plans are
followed, either in real-time or after the fact. For example, the com-
munities of Fenwick Island, South Bethany and Bethany Beach are
all instructed to evacuate west on DE 26 ﬁrst and then head north.
This is somewhat similar to the path most travelers would take in
normal circumstances. For example, the weekend before the evacua-
tion 22% of vehicles leaving the area took DE 26 and 28% went north
on DE 1 across the Indian River Inlet. The plans presumably direct
trafﬁc off of State Route 1 so that it does not become congested as it
passes through Dewey, Rehoboth and Lewes.
Despite the plans to evacuate from Fenwick Island, South Bethany
and Bethany Beach by going west on DE 26, as shown in Fig. 6, and not
north on DE 1, a large number of evacuees still went north. During the
period of the evacuation, 30% of vehicles that exited the area used DE
26 and 38% left headed north on DE 1 crossing the Indian River inlet.
Fig. 6. Evacuation map for residents of Fenwick Island, South Bethany, Bethany Beach [30].
9E. Archibald, S. McNeil / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 1–10Despite evacuation plans, there was little difference in route selection be-
tween DE 1 and DE 26. In both cases outbound trafﬁc on DE 26 was 79%
of the volume for outbound trafﬁc on DE 1 at the Indian River inlet.
Even though the use of DE 1 was not according to plans, it did not
appear to cause any problems. Twenty miles north on DE 1 the added
demand from the Fenwick and Bethany area did not have a major im-
pact when added to the trafﬁc from Dewey, Rehoboth and Lewes.
Trafﬁc there peaked at 2253 vehicles per hour, which is only 63% of
capacity.5.4. Advantages/disadvantages of trafﬁc data usage
Trafﬁc data for evacuation monitoring and analysis have both ad-
vantages and disadvantages. For real-time condition monitoring it
can quickly provide some insight, but it requires more analysis to re-
ally understand how many people evacuated from an area. Another
problem is that the data do not distinguish among households evacu-
ating to a safer location within town, to a nearby town or out of the
area. For example, if some people are evacuating to a given town
and others are evacuating from that town, it will be difﬁcult to tell
how many people evacuated that town.
The usefulness of trafﬁc data can also be limited by difﬁculties in
analyzing data to provide useful information to decision-makers.
There are many sources of this difﬁculty. Many times there will not
be enough data to provide valuable information. This could bebecause many trafﬁc counters are located in urban areas and not
the rural areas through which many people evacuate. Even when traf-
ﬁc counters are installed they may not function in an emergency due
to loss of solar power or a broken data link. Of the 13 trafﬁc counters
looked at for this analysis two of them did not have data due to solar
power loss during the weekend of the storm and one was setup incor-
rectly making its data completely unusable.
Even when enough data are available it still takes time and effort
to produce meaningful information to guide real-time response.
Even with sufﬁcient stafﬁng it may be difﬁcult to process the data
from hundreds of devices and draw useful information for the dozens
of locales affected by a hurricane. Fortunately, a number of computers
systems exist to make this process easier during an evacuation
[25,38]. With practice and the right computer tools this can be done.
For post disaster evaluation, trafﬁc data do not provide as much
information as other methods, like phone interviews. Unlike phone
interviews, trafﬁc data do not give much insight into who evacuated,
where exactly they came from, where they went to or how they de-
cided to evacuate. For this type of information written or internet sur-
veys, and in person or phone interviews are still necessary.6. Conclusions
Evacuation planning is a key element of disaster preparedness. For
hurricanes, evacuation is one of the most effective and widely used
10 E. Archibald, S. McNeil / IATSS Research 36 (2012) 1–10tactics to protect human life but evacuation is costly and disruptive.
Furthermore, predicting the behavior of the population evacuating
is challenging and there are rarely opportunities to test the plans
prior to a signiﬁcant event. Hurricane Irene provided such an oppor-
tunity. Coastal Delaware was placed under mandatory evacuation as
Hurricane Irene approached the east coast of the United States in Au-
gust 2011. This is peak season for the beach communities and many
vacations were cut short.
Trafﬁc data from automated trafﬁc counters are used to explore
trafﬁc patterns before, during and after the event and make some in-
ferences about the behavior of residents and visitors to the beach
communities of coastal Delaware. The analysis suggests that in the
case of Hurricane Irene in Delaware, the evacuation orders were ef-
fective, provided sufﬁcient lead time, and reached the intended audi-
ence. These conclusions are supported by the analysis that shows that
a signiﬁcant number of residents and visitors evacuated from the
beach communities. Furthermore, the trafﬁc during the evacuation
shows very similar patterns to the trafﬁc patterns experienced on
summer weekends, suggesting that there is adequate capacity for
evacuation, but this trafﬁc did not necessarily use the posted evacua-
tion routes. Ideally survey work could be undertaken to reinforce the
analysis.
These insights suggest that this type of analysis may also be of
value for other events and in other communities where lead times
permit a planned evacuation. When employed properly trafﬁc data
can be useful for improving hurricane evacuation planning and mon-
itoring an evacuation in real-time, and post event assessment of evac-
uation plans.
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